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 The paper investigates the relationships between motivated social cognition (need for 
cognitive closure), personal worldviews (traditional, modern or postmodern), and conservative 
political beliefs.  The relationships were analyzed in a sample of 189 Polish adults. High need for 
closure was found to be associated with support for both traditional and modern worldviews. 
Although different in content (i.e. endorsing different values and assumptions about the methods 
and limits of cognition), the worldviews share similar formal characteristics: both assume the 
absolute nature of values and the existence of definite truths. However, acceptance of the 
traditional worldview was related political conservatism (i.e., support for nationalist and 
isolationist opinions and a stronger role for traditional, religious values in public life), whereas 
acceptance of the modern worldview was associated with a rejection of conservative political 
beliefs. Moreover, personal worldviews mediated the relationship between need for closure and 
political beliefs: support for social conservatism was mediated by acceptance of the traditional 













 Interest in the psychological underpinnings of political preferences, dating back to the 
classic work of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950) and many other 
scholars (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Christie, 1954; Eyseneck, 1954, Rokeach, 1960; Sidanius, 1988; 
Stone 1980; Tetlock, 1983, 1984; Tomkins, 1963), has experienced a resurgence in recent years, 
with a growing number of studies exploring the epistemic motivations behind certain political 
beliefs, especially conservative ones. Of these motivations, one of the most frequently cited and 
examined is the need for cognitive closure – i.e., a desire to quickly formulate and firmly hold 
onto clear opinions rather than accepting cognitive uncertainty (Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser & 
Sulloway, 2003a; see also Chirumbolo, 2002; Golec, 2001, 2002a,b; Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 
1999; Kemmelmeier, 1997; Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003)2.  A high need for closure urges 
individuals to acquire knowledge and form definite opinions on an unknown issue as quickly as 
possible by seizing on the most accessible information. It also motivates people to protect and 
freeze an opinion once it is acquired. Need for closure is often thought of as an individual 
difference, but it can be also heightened or attenuated by situational factors such as time pressure, 
fatigue, or personal accountability for one‟s decisions (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994).  Importantly, a large body of work – thoroughly examined in a seminal review 
by Jost and his colleagues (2003a) –  suggests that the need for cognitive closure (and other 
associated variables, like intolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, low cognitive 
complexity, and close-mindedness) is reliably associated with conservative political beliefs (i.e., 
resistance to change, preference for order, and anti-egalitarianism; see Jost et al. 2003a).  
 However, in a response to Jost et al. (2003a), Greenberg and Jonas (2003) argue that 
different political beliefs may be driven by the same cognitive motivation and that the need for 
closure may be seen as a „content free‟ variable that motivates people to seize and freeze (see 
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) on whatever ideological context that happens to be available. 
According to Jost et al. (2003b), relationships between motivated closed-mindedness and political 
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beliefs other than conservative ones - e.g., socialist economic arrangements (Golec, 2001, 2002a, 
b; Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003) or leftist and liberal social beliefs (McFarland, , Ageyev & 
Abalakina-Paap, 1992; Tetlock, 1983, 1984) 3 - are rare and constitute exceptions that prove the 
more general rule that the need for closure should be associated with whatever beliefs support a 
stable social order with minimal potential for change (e.g., support for features of the old Soviet 
regime following the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s; see McFarland et 
al., 1992).  In this paper we offer a reformulation of this debate by arguing that people high in 
need for closure may be attracted to political ideas whose content differs on the surface, but 
which share certain important formal and structural characteristics.  
 We argue that people high in need for closure may be attracted to certain beliefs not 
because they are accessible or because they secure forms of social organization that are relatively 
simple, stable and predictable, but because they are grounded in more general worldviews whose 
philosophical implications satisfy the need for closure better than others. People high in need for 
closure may be attracted to worldviews in which values are understood as absolute rather than 
relative. They may be also more likely to appreciate worldviews that assume a definite rather than 
an approximate nature of truth. What exactly the values and truths are with respect to their 
content may be of minimal importance with regard to the satisfaction of the seizing and freezing 
tendencies associated with the need for closure. However, the exact content of these values and 
truths may have important consequences for other, more specific political opinions and actions. 
Thus, the need for closure may result in a preference for general worldviews with certain formal 
characteristics. Worldviews that share formal features can be, however, quite different with 
respect to their particular political content. Since people are likely to derive particular political 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Yohannes & O’Brien, 1995), openness to experience (McCrae, 1996), intolerance of ambiguity (see Jost et al, 2003a). 
3 For example, some results suggest that the relationship between need for closure and political beliefs may be context 
dependent. High need for closure seems to predict not only preference of certain social organization (hierarchy, order 
illustrated for example by reoccurring relationship between high need for closure and support for conservative social values) 
but also support for existing status quo and rejection of change (illustrated, for example, by different effects of high need for 
closure on economic preferences in Western and post-communist countries).  
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beliefs from the content of their general worldviews, the need for closure may, in consequence, 
indirectly motivate very different political preferences. 
 This argument is consistent with claims made both by Greenberg and Jonas (2003) and by 
Jost et al. (2003a, b). We argue that the need for closure may produce a drive for stability, definite 
answers, and resistance to change, and that it may motivate people to support political beliefs 
with different content depending on social and political context. We suggest that this drive for 
stability and definiteness is satisfied by general assumptions individuals make about values, truths, 
and the nature of surrounding reality that are more basic than particular political programs and 
the social orders they envision. In order to further develop our argument, we introduce the 
concept of personal worldviews.  
PERSONAL WORLDVIEWS  
Drawing on a broad psychological tradition (e.g. Boski, 2002; Borowiak, 2001a; Hofstede, 
1980; Schwartz, 1996; Stemplewska-Żakowicz, 2001; Triandis, 1995), we define personal 
worldview in this paper as a discrete cognitive meta-structure, made up of two types of beliefs: 
(1) epistemological assertions regarding the nature of truth, cognition (i.e., method of discovering 
the truth), and reality (i.e., whether it is objective or subjective); and (2) axiological assertions 
about professed values (i.e., whether values are absolute or relative) that define individual 
identity4. Worldviews consist of concepts, explanative categories, and values through which 
individuals perceive reality, define life experiences, and construct identities. Personal worldviews 
are constructed by individuals in their socio-cultural environments. For this reason, a typology of 
worldviews is drawn from the typology of cultural media serving to construct them. Most useful 
for these purposes is the widely accepted tripartite classification of cultural materials currently 
used in philosophy (Lyotard, 1979; Jameson, 1998; Rorty, 1991) and sociology (Bauman, 1998a,b; 
                                                          
4
 The meaning of the term worldview has different interpretations in the domains of philosophy, sociology and 
psychology (e.g. Berger & Luckman, 1966; Giddens, 1992; see also  Borowiak 2001a, b). Even within the field 
of psychology it assumes a different meaning when defined, for example, by educational or developmental 
psychology or psychology of religion (Borowiak, 2001a, 2004; see James, 1991; Bond, et al, 2002;  Hofstede, 
1980; Schutz, 1970; Schwartz, 1994, 1996; Triandis, 1995). 
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2003; Giddens, 1992) and which has now found its way into the field of psychology (Kvale, 1992; 
Stemplewska-Żakowicz, 2001; Martin & Sugarman, 2000). This typology consists of the 
worldviews generally referred to as traditional (i.e., pre-modern or religious), modern (i.e., 
scientific or rational) and postmodern (i.e., existential or relativistic). These three types of cultural 
discourse (or sets of cultural beliefs) coexist in the socio-cultural sphere as frameworks for 
interpretation of individual and collective experience5.  
 These personal worldviews - traditional, modern and postmodern - may be seen as ideal 
types of cultural discourse accepted and personalized by individuals (Borowiak, 2001b; 2004). To 
elaborate, the traditional worldview is based on belief in a single, unshakeable truth of a 
transcendental, non-human character, not susceptible to rational verification or evaluation. Such 
ultimate truth gives legitimization to values that are understood as definite and absolute. The 
bringing into universal being of “the one truth” is expected to guarantee an ideal social order. 
Within this worldview the main values are dedication, devotion, and self-sacrifice in the name of 
the foundational truth, and life events are interpreted largely in terms of fate and destiny. In the 
traditional worldview, interpretation of experience comes about by relating it to the 
transcendental reality and absolutized values. Individual identity is treated as given, permanent, 
and unchangeable. Its bases are perceived to be inherited from ancestors, and the past is idealized 
as a storehouse of experiential guidelines and memories about one‟s roots. 
 The modern worldview developed mostly as a critique of traditional ones. Nevertheless, it 
also supports a belief in „one, ultimate truth‟. In this case, however, the truth is verifiable and 
legitimized by rational, scientific means, rather than being given and guaranteed by some 
transcendent reality. Social order and life events are interpreted in terms of mechanisms and 
rights. Making sense of one‟s experience involves the application of a cause-and-effect structure, 
                                                          
5 There is an idea of progress and historical development implied by this classification of cultural beliefs. Interestingly, 
similar progress and change in understanding nature of human cognition and values is reflected in development on individual 
level. Recent theories of cognitive and moral development differentiate developmental stages in which people absolutize 
values from these in which people relativize values (Perry, 1970, 1981, Sinnott, 1989; see also Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969).  
Thus, previous formulations already suggest that individual assumptions about values, goals and limits of human cognition 
parallel those functioning in socio-cultural realm. 
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while the building of one‟s identity is self-discovery, which is understood as getting to know the 
„real self‟ and jettisoning irrational beliefs regarding oneself. Knowledge is the central value, and 
the goal of living is freeing oneself and others of erroneous beliefs that are devoid a rational 
foundation. The imperative of tolerance leads to supporters of truths that are not rational and 
scientific in nature being regarded as people to whom the truth must be pointed out through a 
process of education (Bauman, 1998a, b). The modern worldview looks to the future rather than 
the past, toward a new existence where the dreams of progress are finally to be realized. 
 In turn, the postmodern worldview surfaced as a critique of the basic assumptions of the 
modern worldview. Above all, it casts doubts on the existence of an objective truth that is 
independent of social and historical context: i.e., the place and time where it arises. Within this 
worldview, the process of scientific enquiry is treated as the production of truth, rather than its 
discovery.  All “truths” are perceived as fragmentary and partial; therefore, the primary cultural 
value is the ability to perceive the particularity of one‟s own truths and remain open to other 
“truths” and engage in discussion with them. No “best” description of human experience is 
assumed to exist, thus excluding the possibility of its inter-subjective evaluation. Life events are 
interpreted in terms of chance and serendipity. Moreover, the self is believed not to exist; there 
are many potential selves, and all of them are fluid and variable. Freedom is the central value, 
while the goal of living is the continuously renewed creation of one‟s identity (Rorty, 1989, 1991). 
The greatest interest is aroused by the present, as it is the only moment that is real and accessible. 
These three personal worldviews are sometimes treated as orthogonal factors: they may 
coexist and be accepted at the same time. Studies show, however, that there is a reoccurring 
pattern of relationships between different personal worldviews: people who accept the traditional 
worldview tend to reject the postmodern one, whereas people who accept the modern worldview 
also tend to accept postmodern claims. Traditional and modern worldviews are also positively 
related, although the relationship is relatively weak (Borowiak, 2001b; 2004). This pattern of 
relationships is consistent with the theoretical assumptions behind the tripartite classification of 
 8 
worldviews. The traditional belief in ultimate truth and transcendent reality and the postmodern 
„privatization‟ of truths and values are contradictory and mutually exclusive. However, the 
postmodern worldview can be seen as resulting from the modern one, which acknowledges 
limitations in its own assumptions and principles. Therefore, there is some overlap in the 
conceptual and explanatory categories that make up the modern and postmodern worldviews 
(Bauman, 1996, 1998a, b, 2003). Moreover, the weak yet positive relationship between modern 
and traditional worldviews results from a common characteristic of these two postures: they 
share a similar belief in the existence ultimate truths and absolute values,  even though they 
assume different and often exclusive ways of arriving at the truth and attribute significance to 
different values (see Gellner, 1992). 
NEED FOR CLOSURE, WORLDVIEWS, AND POLITICAL BELIEFS 
 As the preceding discussion suggests, there are reasons to think that values in general can 
be understood in two ways: as substantial, absolute, and concrete; or abstract, disputable, and 
relative (see also Kohlberg, 1984; Tomkins 1963). From this perspective, traditional and modern 
worldviews share similar formal characteristics, even if they are strikingly different in their 
content.  As noted previously, they both assume the existence of definite, absolute truths in 
which definite, absolute values can be grounded. While the traditional worldview values religion, 
tradition, and the past, whereas the modern worldview values science, change, and progress, these 
are seen as ways of achieving virtually the same epistemic goals: ultimate reassurance, definite 
answers, and an escape from ambiguity. Therefore, there is no difference between the traditional 
and modern worldviews with respect to the formal characteristics of the cognitive construction 
of reality provided by these worldviews. However, on this score, differences exist between the 
traditional and modern worldviews and the postmodern one, in that the latter that assumes the 
existence of no definite truths or values and sees reality as ever-changing and never totally or 
firmly defined.  
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 As such, people striving to achieve stable and reassuring closure should find the 
absolutism of the traditional and modern worldviews more appealing than the relativism of the 
postmodern one. Evidence for this prediction can be found in studies on cognition and religious 
beliefs. These studies indicate that people who absolutize rationality and knowledge in order to 
undermine religious claims tend to be as uncomfortable with cognitive ambiguity as those who 
absolutize religious claims. For example, in Wulff‟s classification of approaches to religion, both 
Literal Affirmation (an outlook which assumes the factual existence of the religious realm and 
treats religious beliefs in literal terms) and Literal Disaffirmation (an outlook which rejects the 
existence of a religious realm of any sort and totally denies that religious beliefs have even a  
symbolic meaning) – both of which treat religion in a concrete and literal way, with one rigidly 
supporting and the other rigidly rejecting the transcendent realm –  were found to be related to 
low cognitive development and high cognitive rigidity. In contrast, Reductive Interpretation (i.e., 
an outlook that rejects the factual existence of a transcendental realm but which affirms the 
deeper meaning of religious symbols) –  which treats religion as a spiritual quest, or as a 
metaphor for and approximation of concrete reality – was related to higher levels of cognitive 
development and lower cognitive rigidity (Wulff, 1997; see also Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten & 
Hutsebaut, 2003).  In addition, people who treat religion as hermeneutics – neither rejecting nor 
literally accepting it (e.g. religion as quest orientation; Barron, 1963) – were found to be open-
minded, complex, tolerant of ambiguity, less dogmatic, and lower in need for closure (Duriez, 
Fontaine & Hutsebaut, 2000; see also Fowler, 1981; Hutsebaut, 1996; Saroglou, 2002; Wulff, 
1997).  Thus, there are reasons to believe that the need for closure underpins certain approaches 
to truth and values (i.e., one that are definite, absolute, and stable) rather than others (i.e., one 
that are metaphorical, relative, and changeable).  
In turn, political preferences can be seen as resulting from personal worldviews and 
reflecting the content of the values and basic truths individuals accept. The traditional worldview, 
with its orientation towards the past and its rejection of whatever deviates from the one “right” 
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way of doing things, is likely to result in conventionalism, a punitive attitude towards social 
deviants, and support for social hierarchy and control – i.e., the outlook typically described as 
“conservative” (see Jost et al., 2003a). The modern worldview, with its orientation towards the 
future and progress and its emphasis on tolerance and education, should lead to acceptance of a 
more liberal politics, with support for individual rights and social freedoms, equality, and 
education. This link between the modern worldview and liberalism makes sense especially in 
Poland and other postcommunist countries, where liberal discourse was developed in opposition 
to political regimes and focused not on claims of epistemological relativity but rather on universal 
morality that supports basic human rights. However, it might be also expected that political 
liberalism, with its emphasis on individual freedoms, may be an expression of the postmodern 
worldview, with its claims of relativity and individual choice. This orientation would seem to be 
particularly descriptive of liberalism as it is manifested in the established democracies of Western 
Europe and North America.   
Along these lines, we argue that the effects of the high need for cognitive closure on 
political beliefs may be mediated by personal worldviews. A high need for closure may  underlie 
personal worldviews that differ in their content but which share certain formal characteristics, i.e. 
the traditional and modern worldviews. Since these two worldviews differ in the political 
preferences they imply, a high need for closure may be indirectly associated with political 
conservatism via support for the traditional worldview and indirectly associated with a rejection 
of conservatism via support for the modern worldview.  Thus, in the present study we 
investigated two hypotheses: (1) the need for cognitive closure should be positively related to the 
acceptance of the traditional and modern worldviews and negatively related to support for the 
postmodern worldview; and (2) personal worldviews should mediate the relationship between the 
need for closure and political conservatism, with the need for closure being related to support for 
conservatism via the traditional worldview and a rejection of conservatism via the modern 
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worldview. We also expected that the rejection of conservative beliefs would be related to the 
acceptance of both modern and postmodern worldviews. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
The study was conducted using a convenience sample of 189 Polish adults aged 18 to 44 
(M= 24.5; SD= 5.09), of these 122 were female and 67 male. Three participants had a primary 
school education, 91 had a high school education, 63 were students and 22 had a college 
education (ten subjects did not indicate their education level). The questionnaires were 
distributed by authors and 2 student research assistants to the shoppers in a large shopping centre 
in Warsaw‟s district Praga during 5 consecutive days in summer 2004. Participants took on 
average 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire. They were given sweets in exchange for their 
participation. 
MEASUREMENT 
 Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire containing (1) the Political Beliefs 
Scale (see Mazurek, Wojciszke, & Baryła, 2001), (2) the „How do you view and the world around 
you?‟ Questionnaire (Borowiak, 2001b, 2004), with subscales measuring the traditional, modern 
and postmodern worldviews and (3) a Polish adaptation of the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale 
(Golec 2001, 2002a,b; see also Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003).  
Political Beliefs Scale 
 The Political Beliefs Scale contains 10 items that have been used on various occasions in 
opinion polls conducted in national samples of Poles. Together, they form a scale with very high 
reliability ( = .89) (see Mazurek, Wojciszke & Baryła, 2001; Boski, 1993). Participants were 
asked to indicate how much they disagree or agree with each of the 10 items on a response scale 
ranging from „1 = definitely disagree‟ to „6 = definitely agree‟. The actual items ask about 
preferred forms of social organization and preferred values for the regulation of social order and 
the organization of the state (e.g. “Christian values should have special place in Polish politics” or 
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“Poland should be only for Poles”). Higher scores indicate support for conservatism in the Polish 
context, i.e., support for a religious, national state and the rejection of a secular, European state 
(see Boski, 1993, Golec, 2001, 2002a,b). 
Personal worldviews 
 The 36-item „How do you view yourself and the world around you?‟ Questionnaire 
(Borowiak, 2004) was used in order to measure acceptance of the three personal worldviews 
discussed above. The questionnaire contains three 12-item subscales measuring the (a) traditional, 
(b) modern, and (c) postmodern worldviews. Participants evaluated the statements in each scale 
independently since all types of worldviews may coexist in individual mentality. Therefore, each 
person obtained three independent scores: the higher the score in a given scale, the greater the 
acceptance of the world-view it corresponds to. 
 In the items in each subscale, participants are asked to indicate how much they agree with 
each statement using a Likert-type scale ranging from „1 = definitely disagree‟ to „6 = definitely 
agree‟. The subscale measuring acceptance of the traditional worldview consisted of items 
referring to belief in the transcendental validation of truth, the ultimate nature of truth, and the 
absolute nature of values (e.g., “The most important thing in a person‟s life is a deep and 
authentic faith” or “To be oneself is to be aware of one‟s roots”;  = .89). Support for the 
modern worldview was measured  items reflecting the absolutization of rationality and progress 
(e.g. “Only opinions that are rationally justified should be accepted” or “I am who I am only 
because of my education and self- improvement”;  = .88). Acceptance of the postmodern 
worldview was assessed using items reflecting a belief in the relative nature of cognition and 
values (e.g. “We create truths for our own purposes” or “Creating an ever new image of oneself 
is the main task in life”; = .66).  See Appendix 2 for further information on these items.  
 The statements making up the items in the “How do you view yourself and the world 
around you?” Questionnaire were developed from content analyses of cultural texts 
representative of traditional, modern and postmodern discourse. Statements representing 
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traditional discourse were taken from the encyclical letters of Pope John Paul II. They were 
carefully chosen in order to avoid reference to particular religious beliefs; rather, they represented 
guidelines about how to believe and how to relate to values. Statements representing modern 
discourse were based on writings of philosophers from the Age of Enlightenment.  Finally, 
statements representing postmodern discourse were chosen from works of key postmodern 
philosophers and sociologists (e.g., Bauman, Lyotard, Rorty). The statements corresponding to 
these three personal worldviews were evaluated for consistency with criterial aspects of 
traditional, modern and postmodern discourse by two experts: a cultural anthropologist and 
cross-cultural psychologist (whose rating were highly correlated; r = .93).  The resulting items 
were then pretested in a sample of 205 Polish adults. The psychometric properties of the 
questionnaire were then evaluated in a second sample of 716 Polish and 114 Swiss adults. 
Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses conducted on the items in the questionnaire 
consistently produced a three-factor solution with factors corresponding to the traditional, 
modern, and postmodern worldviews. The pattern of relationships between the worldviews was 
the same in the Polish and Swiss samples. Participants from both samples differed with respect to 
their acceptance of the three worldviews in a theory- consistent way: Compared to the Polish 
participants (from a relatively traditional and homogenous culture), Swiss participants (from a 
relatively postmodern and heterogeneous culture; see Boski 2002; Hofstede, 1991; Schwartz, 
1996) were more likely to accept the postmodern worldview and less likely to accept traditional 
and modern worldviews. Personal worldviews were also related to age: as theory would predict, 
the traditional worldview was more strongly endorsed accepted by older participants, while the 
modern worldview and especially the postmodern worldview were more strongly endorsed by 
younger participants in both countries. These findings provide theoretical validation of the three 
scales.6 (Borowiak, 2004).  
                                                          
6 The external validity of the scales was also confirmed through inter-group comparisons between students of theology and 
psychology: according to expectations theology students accepted traditional worldview and rejected postmodern one more 
strongly than psychology students (Borowiak, 2004) 
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 In the present study, a principal axis factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation 
conducted on the 36 items of the „How do you view yourself and the world around you?‟ 
Questionnaire revealed a three-factor solution with loadings for the traditional worldview scale 
ranging from .37 to .87; loadings for modern worldview scale ranging from .51 to .77; and 
loadings for postmodern worldview scale ranging from .24 to .74. The three-factor solution 
explained 43.15 % of variance. Moreover, there was a negative correlation between the traditional 
and postmodern subscales (r = -.27, p < .0002) and a positive correlation between the modern 
and postmodern subscales (r= .21, p < .003). The relationship between traditional and modern 
subscales was negative and non-significant (r = -.10; p = .53) (see Table 1). These results 
corroborate earlier findings and are in agreement with theoretical suggestions offered by the 
sociological and anthropological literatures (Bauman, 1996, 2003; Gellner, 1992; Jameson, 1998). 
Similarly, the present results corroborate the earlier finding that support for the traditional 
worldview is positively correlated with age (r = .14; p <.05). 
Need for cognitive closure  
 Finally, individual differences in the need for cognitive closure were assessed using a 
Polish translation of the 42-item Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (Golec 2001, 2002a,b; see also 
Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003; see Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; for the original scale). Responses 
were coded so that higher scores indicated a higher need for cognitive closure ( = .86).  
RESULTS 
 The first hypothesis tested in the present study was that the need for closure would be 
positively associated with worldviews that seek to secure a stable and predictable vision of reality, 
i.e., the traditional and modern worldviews. We also expected that a high need for closure would 
be associated with a rejection of the uncertain, relativistic postmodern worldview. The results 
presented in Table 1 indicate support for these predictions. The need for closure was significantly 
and positively related both to the traditional (r = .37, p < .001) and modern (r = .24, p < .001) 
worldviews, but it was negatively related to postmodern worldview (r = -.13 , p < .07).  
 15 
 In addition, results presented in Table 1 offer preliminary support for our claim that 
different worldviews may be related to different political beliefs. Support for the traditional 
worldview was related to political conservatism in the Polish context (r = .74, p < .001), whereas 
acceptance of modern worldview was related to a rejection of conservatism (r = -.18, p < .015). 
Similarly, acceptance of the postmodern worldview was also related to a rejection of 
conservatism (r = -.30, p < .001). The need for closure was positively correlated with support for 
conservative beliefs (r = .28, p < .0001), but a regression analysis including the need for closure 
and all three personal worldviews as predictors of conservatism reduced this relationship to non-
significance, suggesting that one or more of the worldviews may mediate the relationship 
between the need for closure and conservatism (see Table 2). Therefore, in the next step we 
examined the main mediation hypothesis, which suggested that the need for closure would be 
indirectly associated with different political beliefs depending on whether its effects are mediated 
by the traditional or modern worldview. More precisely, we assumed that a high need for closure 
would be indirectly related to support for conservatism via the traditional worldview, and that it 
would be indirectly related to a rejection of conservatism via the modern worldview. Since the 
results of our correlational analyses revealed that postmodernism may also be related to both the 
need for closure and political beliefs, we included this worldview in our mediation analyses as 
well.  
 The mediation hypothesis was examined using a variation of Baron and Kenny‟s method 
(1986) for the assessment of mediation in the regression context.  This analysis is summarized in 
Figure 1.  Three sets of ordinary least-squares regressions were performed (see Greene, 2003; see 
also Baron & Kenny, 1986).  In the first regression, the raw relationship between the need for 
closure and support for conservative political beliefs was examined by regressing scores on the 
Political Beliefs Scale on the need for closure.  In Figure 1, this path is indicated by the dotted 
line connecting the need for closure and political conservatism. The results of this regression 
indicated that this relationship was positive and significant, b = .60, F (1, 188) = 16.24, p < .0001.  
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 In the second set of regressions, the mediators – each of the worldviews –  were 
regressed on need for closure.  The estimates for these paths are shown on the left side of Figure 
1.  They provide additional support for the hypothesis relating a high need for closure to support 
for the traditional and modern worldviews. The need for closure was positively associated with 
acceptance of the traditional worldview, b = 17, F (1, 188) = 30.26, p < .001; and with 
acceptance of the modern worldview, b = 13, F (1, 188) = 10.99, p < .001.  Moreover, the need 
for closure was negatively related to acceptance of the postmodern worldview, b = -.09, F (1, 
188) = 3.29, p < .07.  
 Finally, the last regression added the mediators to the first regression model.  If 
acceptance of a certain worldview significantly mediates the relationship between the need for 
closure and political conservatism, then the coefficient for that worldview should be significant 
and positive, and the magnitude of the coefficient for need for closure should be significantly 
reduced. On the whole, the predictors included in this full model accounted for a significant 
portion of the variance in political conservatism, F (4, 188) = 62.15, p<.00, R2 = .58. The 
estimates for these paths are shown on the right side of Figure 1. Acceptance of the traditional 
worldview was significantly related to conservative political beliefs (b = .67, p < .001), while 
acceptance of modern worldview was associated with a rejection of conservatism (b = -.12, p < 
.05). Similarly, acceptance of the postmodern worldview was associated with a rejection of 
conservatism (b = -.13, p < .08) . Finally, the relationship between need for closure and 
conservatism was reduced to non-significance once the three mediators were added to the model 
(b = .07, p > .54).  
 Formal statistical tests of the indirect effects also provided support for our primary 
mediation hypothesis.  The Sobel test (see Baron & Kenny, 1986) was used to test the 
significance of the indirect effect of the need for closure on conservatism via the traditional, 
modern and postmodern worldviews.  The indirect effects were computed by multiplying the 
path from need for closure to each mediator by the path from each mediator to political 
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conservatism. These results are summarized in Table 3.  As these results indicate, the need for 
closure had significant but oppositely signed indirect effects on political conservatism via 
traditionalism (IE = .11, z = 5.08, p<.00) and modernism (IE =-.017 , z = -1.86, p<.04), but not 
via postmodernism (IE = .01,  z = 1.39, p= .18). 
 The approach proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) – as well as the Sobel test for the 
statistical significance of indirect effects – are the most commonly used methods for the analysis 
of mediation effects in the social sciences (see Preacher & Hayes, 2006). However, when this 
method is used with multiple mediators – as we have here – multicollinearity and the fact that the 
approach relies on series of tests rather than considering the effects of all mediators at the same 
time makes it somewhat problematic (MacKinnon, 2000; Preacher & Hayes, 2006, in press). In 
order to deal with these issues, we used the multivariate delta method (Bishop, Fienberg, & Holland, 
1975; Oehlert, 1992) to estimate the total indirect effect and the bootstrapping method proposed 
by Preacher and Hayes (2006) to obtain the confidence intervals for the total indirect effect and 
the specific indirect effects of each mediator.  
First, we estimated the total indirect effect and its confidence intervals and the effects of 
individual mediators in the context of a multiple-mediator model (Preacher & Hayes, 2006; see 
Table 4). As indicated above, the total effect of need for cognitive closure on political 
conservatism amounted to b = .60, p < .0001, while its direct effect was b = .07, p < .57. The 
difference between the total and direct effects is the total indirect effect via the three mediators. 
It has a point estimate of .53 (z = 3.68) and a 95% bootstrap confidence interval of .23 to .82. 
Since zero does not fall into this interval, the total indirect effect of all three mediators is 
significant. An examination of the specific indirect effects indicates that only traditionalism and 
modernism are statistically significant and independent mediators of the effect of need for 
cognitive closure on political conservatism. The specific indirect effect of the need for closure via 
the traditional worldview is .55 (z = 4.32) with a confidence interval of .32 to 82, indicating a 
significant effect. The point estimate for the specific indirect effect of the need for closure via the 
 18 
modern worldview is -.05 (z = 1.59) with a confidence interval of -.13 to -.003, also indicating a 
significant effect. Finally, the specific indirect effect of the need for closure via the postmodern 
worldview is .02 (z = 1.24) with a confidence interval of -.001 to .089, indicating a non-significant 
effect. Thus, we can conclude that a high need for closure is indirectly related to support for 
conservatism via the traditional worldview and indirectly related to a rejection of conservatism via 
the modern worldview.  Although the indirect effect of the need for closure via the traditional 
worldview is stronger and more robust than its indirect effect via the modern worldview, the 
latter remains significant over and beyond the indirect effect via traditionalism. 
DISCUSSION 
 Studies of the relationship between the cognitive and motivational characteristics of 
individuals and their political preferences are part of a long and rich tradition. Starting with early 
formulations by Fromm (1941, 1973), Adorno et al. (1950) and Frankel-Brunswik (1949), work in 
this vein has related cognitive rigidity, simplicity, lack of independent thinking, and intolerance of 
ambiguity to political conservatism. However, other studies soon reported that similar individual 
characteristics could also motivate support for radicalism on both the right and the left (Rokeach, 
1960; Eyseneck, 1954; Tetlock, 1983, 1984), support for chronic centrism (Sidanius, 1988), 
support for whatever political beliefs are accessible in a given context (Jost et al. 1999; see 
Greenberg & Jonas, 2003), or support for whatever beliefs constitute the status quo (Golec, 2001, 
2002a, b; Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003). In their review, Jost et al. (2003a, b) claim that 
conservative political ideologies – supporting a social order that is hierarchical, stable, and 
predictable – are more likely than any other set of political beliefs to satisfy a psychological need 
to avoid cognitively complex or ambiguous environments. Exceptions to this rule may exist (e.g. 
support for socialist economic arrangements in post-communist states motivated by a high need 
for closure; Golec 2001), but they are scarce and reflect an essentially “conservative” desire to 
secure a predictable social order with minimal complexity and possibility for change in different 
historical, cultural, and political contexts.  
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Our results support and further explain the main claim of Jost et al (2003a, b) and 
propose an explanation for the existence of the aforementioned exceptions. Our argument 
follows a line of recent contributions suggesting that motivated closed-mindedness is indirectly 
rather than directly related to political beliefs. In this vein, recent studies show that the 
relationship between need for closure and political conservatism may be mediated by more 
general systems of beliefs (Chirumbolo, 2002; Kossowska, 2006; Van Hiel, Pandelaere & Duriez, 
2004).  
In this paper, we argue that the need for closure motivates support for generalized personal 
worldviews - cognitive meta-structures consisting of epistemological assumptions about the nature 
of truth and knowledge and axiological assertions about the nature of esteemed basic values. The 
worldviews are constructed in socio-cultural contexts and reflect available cultural discourses. 
Individuals adopt them in order to understand surrounding reality and find guidance for their 
attitudes and actions. Based on developments within sociology (Bauman, 1998a,b; 2003; Giddens, 
1992), philosophy and cultural studies (Lyotard, 1979; Jameson, 1998; Rorty, 1991), and 
psychology (Kvale, 1992; Martin & Sugarman, 2000; Stemplewska-Żakowicz, 2001), we 
differentiated between traditional, modern and postmodern worldviews for the purposes of our 
own work.  
Results obtained in a sample of Polish adults confirmed the hypothesis that a high need 
for closure would be related to support for traditional and modern worldviews, which differ in 
content but share similar assumptions about absolute and stable nature of values and truths. In 
addition, the results confirmed that a high need for closure was related to the rejection of a 
postmodern worldview grounded only in relative truths and values. Unlike the traditional and 
modern worldviews, it assumes that there is no ultimate knowledge or objective reality. It accepts 
and endorses uncertainty, change, and the possibility of reinterpretating truths and values (see 
Borowiak, 2001a). More importantly, the results confirm also the mediational hypothesis that the 
relationship between the need for cognitive closure and political conservatism would be 
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differentially mediated by the worldviews. Our mediation analyses indicated that the relationship 
between need for closure and political conservatism was fully but oppositely mediated by 
acceptance of traditional and modern worldviews. While a high need for closure was indirectly 
related to support for conservatism via the traditional worldview, it was indirectly related to a 
rejection of conservatism via the modern worldview. Nevertheless, the indirect effect via the 
traditional worldview was substantially stronger than the indirect effect via modern worldview. 
This result reinforces the conclusions of earlier studies suggesting that the effect of the need for 
closure on political conservatism is indirect rather then direct, and that it results from more basic 
assumptions people make about surrounding reality (see Chiurubmolo 2002; Kossowska, 2006; 
Van Hiel, Pandelaere & Duriez, 2004).  
Our results also provide support for Jost and his colleagues‟ (2003) claim that the 
relationship between high need for closure and political conservatism is strong and robust and 
that it results from the ability of conservatism to satisfy the desire for stable definitions of reality 
characteristic of those high in the need for closure. However, our results suggest also that a high 
need for closure may also indirectly motivate support for non-conservative beliefs under certain 
circumstances. In the present study, a high need for closure was associated with support for the 
modern worldview over and beyond its relationship with support for the traditional one. 
Moreover, the modern worldview significantly mediated the relationship between the need for 
closure and rejection of political conservatism. Although the indirect effect of the need for 
closure via the modern worldview was much smaller than its indirect effect via the traditional 
worldview, it remained significant even after the latter was taken into account. This suggests that 
the need for closure may lead to support for either conservative or non-conservative political 
beliefs, depending on which worldview mediates the relationship between the need for closure 
and political beliefs; the only requirement is that the desire for a stable, predictable reality is 
satisfied. In other words, the desire for a seemingly stable and predictable world may be secured 
by absolute truths and values that guarantee achievement of closure, but the specific content of 
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the truths and values –  and the political preferences that result from them – are secondary to 
these basic epistemological and axiological priorities. In cultural contexts where modern values 
are available, they may attract people high in need for closure (albeit to a lesser extent that the 
traditional worldview) and lead to support for a liberal political program more consistent with the 
values central to the modern worldview.  
This finding suggests that cognitively conservative liberals do in fact exist, at least in 
certain political contexts. In fact, the relationships between need for closure, support for the 
modern worldview, and political liberalism might seem a little surprising to those more familiar 
with Western political and cultural contexts, given the strong association between contemporary 
Western liberalism and the open-endedness of postmodernity.  However, it can be explained 
more easily in the context of Eastern Europeand history and politics. In Poland and other post-
communist countries, the liberal discourse was influenced by an emphasis on a binding universal 
morality (centered on human rights and basic freedoms), rather than the epistemological and 
moral relativism of more affluent societies. Such „modern‟ values gave rise to the principles of 
political and social tolerance and openness in opposition to political repression. Thus, at least in 
this particular political and historical context, a modern worldview may provide epistemic closure 
just like traditionalism does, while giving rise to liberal political beliefs instead of conservative 
ones. However, this does not suggest that the need for closure is a “content free” variable (see 
Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Instead, it implies that cognitive closure may be provided by very 
different worldviews and beliefs, as long as they all share similar formal characteristics that appeal 
to people high in the need for closure.   
As noted above, the results obtained here may depend on the particular cultural and 
political context in which this study was conducted. Therefore, the generalizability of the 
relationships between the high need for closure, the modern worldview, and acceptance of liberal 
political values remains to be established. However, the very finding that a high need for closure 
may express itself differently depending on political and cultural context provides an important 
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addition to our knowledge of the relationship between cognitive and motivational process and 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Key Variables  
 Descriptives Intercorrelations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 
 
1.  Need for closure  
2.  Traditional worldview 
3.  Modern worldview 
4.  Postmodern worldview 














































Effects of the need for closure and personal worldviews on political conservatism 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor B SE b B SE b 
 
Need for closure 
 
 
     .60*** 
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F (degrees of freedom) 
R2 
N 









Note.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.   





Indirect Effects of Need For Closure on Support for Conservative Political Beliefs  through Traditionalism, 
Modernism and Postmodernism 
 
  Goodman‟s test 
Indirect effects Indirect effect Z-score p-value 
Traditional worldview .11 5.08 .000 
Modern worldview - .017 - 1.86 .040 
Postmodern worldview  .01   1.39 .180 
 






Bootstrapped Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals for the Total and Specific Indirect Effects of Indirect 
Effects of Need For Closure on Support for Conservative Political Beliefs through Traditionalism, Modernism and 
Postmodernism   
 





SE Z Lower  Upper  
 Traditional worldview .5620 .1296 4.32 .3168      .8177 
 Modern worldview -.0500 .0315 1.59 -.1276 -.0031     
 Postmodern worldview .0252 .0206 1.24 -.0013 .0877 
 Total .5376 .1461 3.68 .2326 .8233 

































































Figure 1. Mediators of the Relationship Between Need for Closure and Conservative Political 
Beliefs (casual steps model) (+ p<.10 *p<.05,  **p<.01,  ***p<.001). 
 
 36 
 Appendix 1 
Items of the Political Beliefs Scale 
 
1. Catholicism should be the state religion in Poland 
2. Christian values should have a special place in Polish politics 
3. Public life in Poland should be guided by the social teaching of the Catholic Church 
4. Poland should be only for Poles  
5. Poland should be more Catholic 
6. Prenatal life should be legally protected 
7. The government should fight pornography more effectively 
8. Abortion should be legal (reverse-scored)  
9. Poland should protect itself from the overflow of fashions and life styles alien to our 
culture 
10. The government should limit and control actions of foreigners in Poland
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Appendix 2 
Items of the “How do you view yourself and the world around you?” questionnaire (Borowiak, 
2001, 2004) 
Read the following statements and mark your answer with a small cross in the appropriate box. 
“Totally disagree” means an absolute lack of agreement, whereas “Totally agree” means an absolute 
agreement with a given statement. What counts is your own opinion, not what others think. 
Therefore, any answer is correct as long as it is your own. Try to complete this task rather 
quickly- the first answer is often the best one.  
 
Totally agree Agree Somewhat agree 
 
It is hard to say  
( I don‟t know) 
 




1. Faith gives life meaning. 
2. Those who question faith are in error. 
3. The most important thing in a person‟s life is a deep and authentic faith. 
4. The truth has been revealed to people. 
5. To be oneself is to be aware of one‟s roots. 
6. God is the creator of the world, and human life is dependent on His will. 
7. God is the only truth. 
8. Truth is in our faith and tradition. 
9. Bad people disregard the principles of faith. 
10. One cannot avoid one‟s destiny. 
11. Only one truth exists. 
12. Proclaiming the truth to others is worthwhile under all circumstances, even when putting 
our lives in danger. 
Modern Worldview 
1. One should aspire to disseminate all truths and scientific discoveries so people will act 
according to them. 
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2. Only opinions that are rationally justified should be accepted. 
3. Rational opinions should be widely disseminated- this is the major purpose of education. 
4. I am who I am only because of my education and self- improvement. 
5. Through scientific experiments, the truth is revealed. 
6. Science is about discovering truths. 
7. The truth should be rationally proven. 
8. Rules that govern life can be defined and discovered. 
9. Truth is a rational judgment, which is scientifically verified. 
10. The possibility of understanding the world in a rational manner makes life meaningful. 
11. Only what can be rationally explained is true. 
12. The most important thing in one‟s life is a vast and ever growing knowledge. 
Postmodern Worldview 
1. Truth does not exist- there are only opinions of individual people. 
2. We create truths for our own purposes. 
3. One creates oneself. 
4. Trying to find a permanent meaning in life is an illusion. 
5. All truths are partial and incomplete. 
6. I desire to continually create myself anew. 
7. What is most important in life happens by accident. 
8. Even the most ludicrous views and opinions should be tolerated. 
9. People should keep their opinions and convictions to themselves. 
10. Creating an ever new image of oneself is the main task in life. 
11. All truths are relative. 
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